Аннотация

Идея стратегического мышления совершенно противоположна традиции увязывать выбор агентов (индивидуальных или коллективных) с процессом максимизации при наличии ограничений. Теория общего равновесия обесценила понятие стратегии, так же как теория всеобщей свободной торговли девальвировала понятие суверенитета. Но эта парадигма разваливается. С появлением радикальной неопределенности, ставшей очевидной из-за пандемии COVID-19, нужно заново изучать науку и искусство стратегии, ведь мы живем в мире баланса сил. Как можно определить стратегию? Необходимо четко различать стратегию государства и стратегию компании. Этот дискуссионный вопрос находится в самом фокусе спора о роли и значении различных институций в экономике. Существует множество стратегий. Поэтому нужно задаться вопросом: следует ли упражняться в искусстве выбора стратегии, если присутствует имманентная предрасположенность к рискованным операциям.

Ключевые слова

Стратегия, стратегическое мышление, неопределенность, риск, процессуальная рациональность, индивидуальные предпочтения, информация, знание

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